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ABSTRACT 
Merger Profitability in Industries with Brand Portfolios and Loyal 
Customers    
by Kai A. Konrad * 
We study the equilibrium effects of mergers between firms with brand portfolios 
and brand loyal customers for pricing and profitability. We find that the "merger 
paradox" (Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 1983) is absent in these markets. The 
acquisition of brand portfolios can be profit enhancing for the merging firms and 
payoff neutral for the firms not involved in the merger. This may explain the 
emergence of brand conglomerates such as Richemont, PPR or LVMH. 
 
Keywords: Brand portfolios, merger profitability, customer loyalty 
 
JEL classification: D43, L22, M31 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Rentabilität von Fusionen in Industrien mit Brand-Portfolios und 
loyalen Kunden  
Wir untersuchen die Gleichgewichtseffekte von Fusionen, zwischen Firmen mit 
Marken-Portfolios und markenloyalen Kunden, im Hinblick auf Preisbildung und 
Rentabilität. Wir können dabei feststellen, dass das „merger paradox“ (Salant, 
Switzer und Reynolds 1983) in diesen Märkten fehlt. Die Akquisition von 
Marken-Portfolios kann für die fusionierenden Firmen Gewinn steigernd und 
auszahlungsneutral für die nicht an der Fusion beteiligten Firmen sein. Dies 
könnte die Entstehung von Marken-Konglomeraten wie Richemont, PPR oder 
LVMH erklären.     
 
                                                 
*  I thank Florian Morath for valuable comments. The usual caveat applies.  
 
 
1 Introduction
Horizontal mergers of rms in markets with well-known brand names is a frequent
phenomenon. The brand portfolio of an acquisition target is often an important co-
determinant of the value of the acquired rm1, and the acquired rms portfolio of
brands is often continued and promoted by the acquiring company.2 Some important
examples can be seen in the car industry3, luxury consumer products4, and fashion
industry. We study the merger protability in markets which are characterized by
such rms with multipe brands. We assume that customers can either be price sensi-
tive, or may be loyal to one or the other brand, purchasing a product of this brand if
and only if the price of the product is not higher than some reservation price. Firms
may own several brands which constitute their brand portfolio. They may make pric-
ing decisions on each of its brand in their portfolio. We consider the protability
of mergers and acquisitions between rms with multiple brands. We ask how the
protability of merger depends on the composition of the brand portfolio, and how
the merger a¤ects bystanding rms which are not involved in the merger.
The analysis of motives for mergers and acquisitions and the implications of
such merger for protability and welfare has been a eld of very active research for the
1According to Bahadir, Bharadwaj and Srivastava (2008) the value of brands owned by the target
rm is substantial, and for some rms they report that the brand portfolio value accounted for about
one half of the rm value. In their theory they focus on marketing synergies and economies of scale.
2Bahadir, Bharadwaj and Srivastava (2008) discuss why this policy is more common if the ac-
quiring rm has a diversied brand portfolio (e.g., GM), compared to a rm with a single or very
few strong brands (e.g., GM) that may decide to disconnect some of the target rms brands.
3Several car producers have acquired a whole number of other brands. Volkswagen, for instance,
absorbed rms such as Audi, Skoda, Seat, some high-status labels such as Bugatti, Lamborghini
and Bentley, and Porsche in 2009. Similarly, BMW absorbed Mini and Rolls-Royce and tried to
integrate Rover, and Ford acquired Jaguar, Land Rover and Volvo, plus shares in Mazda and Aston
Martin.
4For instance, the company LVMH was born from a merger of Moët Hennessy and Louis Vuit-
ton S.A. Both rms own very strong brands in the segment of luxury consumer products, where
LVMH itself is partially owned by the haute couture fashion retailer Christian Dior (see, e.g.,
http://www.lvmh.com/fonctionalite/pg_faq_histo.asp.) The conglomerate PPR, formerly known
as Pinault-Printemps-Redoute, owns Gucci, which, itself, owns strong brands such as Yves Saint
Laurent, Sergio Rossi, Boucheron, Bottega Veneta, Bédat & Co, Alexander McQueen, Stella Mc-
Cartney, Balenciaga (See http://www.ppr.com/front__sectionId-183_Changelang-en.html).
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last 25 years. The formal study of the equilibrium e¤ects on protability of merger
has an important starting point in the merger paradox that was derived by Salant,
Switzer and Reynolds (1983). Their analysis of mergers in a symmetric Cournot mar-
ket with constant marginal cost showed that such a merger is typically unprotable
for the rms that merge, whereas bystanding rms benet from the increase in con-
centration.5 A complementary paper by Deneckere and Davidson (1985) who consider
Bertrand markets with di¤erentiated products is the starting point of a long series of
studies that describe conditions for which the merger paradox is moderated. A re-
cent (non-exhaustive) survey on the merger paradox is by Huck, Konrad and Müller
(2008).6 However, a milder version of the merger paradox remains even for many of
these studies, including the case of Bertrand competition, as the bystanding rms
would often gain more from the merger than the merging rms, essentially leading to
a situation in which all rms like mergers, but prefer to let other rms merge. In our
analysis of merger between rms with multiple brands and brand-loyal customers, the
merger is either protable for the merging rms or does not a¤ect their prots. The
prots of bystanding rms are una¤ected. We build on a stock of results from the
theory of price competition between rms who have groups of loyal customers and
who also compete for groups of customers who are price sensitive and not loyal to
only one or the other brand. This type of competition theory originated with Varian
5Their basic argument is intuitive and robust. If, for example, three identical rms A, B and C
compete in a Cournot market, each of the rms makes a prot equal to 1/3 of the oligopoly prot
that emerges in the market with three active rms. If rms B and C merge into B&C, from a
strategic point of view this leads to a duopoly with two symmetric rms. The whole industry prot
in this market increases from that of an oligopoly with three rms to the duopoly prot. But the
share of the prot that is earned by rms B and C is reduced from 1/3 + 1/3 = 2/3 to 1/2, whereas
bystanding rm As prot increases from 1/3 of the former oligopoly prot to 1/2 of the (higher)
duopoly prot. This merger paradox was a challenge and triggered numerous contributions.
6The paradox is weakened by possible synergies (Perry and Porter 1985), the strategic e¤ects of
sequential decision making (Daughety 1990), governance structure inside the merged entity (Huck,
Konrad and Müller 2004, Creane and Davidson 2004), strategic delegation (Ziss 2001, González-
Maestre and López-Cuñat 2001), incomplete information (Amir, Diamantoudie and Xue 2009) and
the presence of strategic players other than the competing rms (Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard
2005, Huck and Konrad 2004). Sagasta and Saracho (2008) consider merger in durable goods
markets, Zhou (2008) considers the protability of a merger if there are production shocks. The
merger paradox has also been tested in the lab (see Huck, Konrad, Müller and Normann 2007 and
Davis and Wilson 2008).
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(1980) and developed rapidly, with important contributions by Narasimhan (1988),
Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1992) and many others.7 In Bertrand competition with
loyal customer groups, when making pricing decisions rms must decide whether to
choose a high price, by which they are likely to lose all non-loyal customers to other
rms and most likely sell to their loyal customers only, or whether they would also
like to compete for the price-sensitive customers. In the latter case, they have to
lower their prices, implying that they also sell to their loyal customers at these lower
prices. One important property of this type of competition is that it establishes a
situation in which many rms can sustain high prices, with only very few rms being
engaged in price competition.8
Brands may di¤er in the size of their loyal customer groups, with "weak"
brands having few and "strong" brands having many loyal customers. We show
that the composition of rmsbrand portfolios matters. The relative size of loyal
customer groups in the weaker brands is a key element for the question whether a
merger among rms with brands with loyal customers is protable or not, and whether
such a merger harms or benets other non-merging rms in this industry. We nd
that the acquisition of rms with one or several brands may but need not change the
distribution of prices in the Bertrand equilibrium. The relative size of loyal customers
of the weakest brands (their "strength") in the acquiring rm and in the rm acquired
matters. A merger that brings together a set of very strong brands does not a¤ect the
pricing equilibrium. There may be possible scale economies and a possible change in
the strength of brands due to the movement of ownership of the brand from one rm
to another, which may be prot relevant. We remove such e¤ects from the picture
and focus on the pure e¤ects of changes in equilibrium pricing. A merger that brings
together rms with the weakest brands in their portfolio can change the equilibrium
7Recent extensions to this model include Baye and Morgan (2004) and Chioveanu (2008) who
endogenizes consumer loyalty, Hann, Hui, Lee and Png (2008) who account for consumersconcerns
for privacy, Bhardwaj, Chen and Godes (2008), focusing on the sellers control of information, Villas-
Boas and Villas-Boas (2009) consider dynamic aspects of price information, and Sinitsyn (2008) who
generalizes Narasimhans model to continuous demand. For an experimental evaluation see Morgan,
Orzen and Sefton (2006).
8Lal and Villas-Boas (1998) broaden the picture to allow for vertical supply structures with
di¤erent combinations of customer loyalty (see also Sha¤er and Zhang 2002 and Srinivasan, Pauwels,
Hanssens and Dekimpe 2004).
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pricing and typically has a positive e¤ect on protability for the rms who engage in
the merger, and no protability e¤ects for all other rms.
Empirically, the role of heterogeneity of customers with some customer groups
being loyal to specic brands and other customers being sensitive only to prices, is
important at least in some markets. Brands play a prominent role in the car market.
Many of the large car companies support and market a whole set of brands. GM and
Volkswagen are prominent examples.9 Similarly, a series of mergers and acquisitions
led to Richemont, a company that owns, for instance, Cartier, Van Cleef & Arpels,
Piaget, Vacheron Constantin, A. Lange & Söhne, Jaeger-LeCoultre, O¢ cine Panerai,
International Watch Co, and Baume et Mercier, which are all high-end producers of
jewelry and/or wrist watches, and a number of further brands, such as Montblanc or
Alfred Dunhill.10 Similar to the car industry example, it can hardly be argued that
the di¤erent watches produced by these subsidiaries are di¤erentiated horizontally or
vertically along purely functional or quality dimensions. The main di¤erence between
the di¤erent sets of watches produced is, seemingly, their brand name. These examples
suggest that what rms acquired in these processes was not mainly aimed at owning
a balanced portfolio of di¤erentiated products, but that the acquisition of brands was
a key element of these acquisitions of rms, as acquiring a brand essentially involved
the acquisition of a set of loyal customers.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we formally review some of the results
in the literature which we use for analysing merger of multi-brand rms and analyse
merger between single-brand rms. We then turn to the main contribution in this
paper and analyse merger between multi-brand rms. Section 3 o¤ers conclusions.
9It is important to note that brands are not just horizontally di¤erentiated products. Volkswagen
and its subsidiary, Audi, produce a whole set of models and many of these models correspond most
closely with each other. From a purely technical point of view, some of their models are very close
substitutes, or can even be seen as perfect substitutes, given that they are equipped with the same
technology and are even partially produced using the same components. The key di¤erence between
these corresponding models is the di¤erence in brand name, and this di¤erence may be important
due to brand loyalty. Rolls-Royce is another example. Rolls-Royce produced virtually the same car
and sold it using two strong brands: Rolls-Royce and Bentley, the di¤erent radiator grills and cooler
bodies being the main distinguishing elements.
10See, e.g., http://www.richemont.com/our_businesses.html.
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2 The merger analysis
We consider the following analytical framework. There is a set S of brand names i,
with i = 1; 2; :::s. In the benchmark case which is our point of departure, the number
of rms 1; :::; s is the same as the number of brands and each rm i produces the
same good with the same constant unit cost normalized to zero for simplicity, owns
one brand and sells its product using this brand name, chooses a price pi and o¤ers
to serve any demand at this price. The choices of prices are made simultaneously and
independently by all rms. There is a large set B of consumers which can be thought
of as the unit interval with unit measure. Each consumer may buy exactly one unit
from exactly one seller, or may not buy at all. The set of consumers is partitioned
into s+1 groups of size n1; n2; :::; ns and m. Consumers from the subset i are loyal to
brand i for i = 1; :::s. They buy one unit of the good of brand i if the price pi for this
brand is not higher than their reservation price r. We denote the share of consumers
which is loyal to brand i as ni, and we assume that brands are numbered according
to their strength:
0  n1 < n2 < ::: < ns: (1)
Brand j is called weaker than brand j+1, as it has a smaller group of loyal consumers.
The weakest brand is brand 1, the strongest brand is brand s. Strict inequality in (1)
is assumed for simplicity, as this helps to eliminate non-generic multiple equilibria.
Further, there is a group of size m of consumers who are not loyal to any of the
brands. Hence, the share of non-loyal consumers is m > 0. Consumers who are
not loyal purchase the good for the lowest price that is o¤ered. This benchmark
case describes the framework analyzed by Kocas and Kiyak (2006), which generalizes
Narasimhan (1988) who considered two single-brand rms with n1  n2, and Baye,
Kovenock and deVries (1992) who considered more than two rms with one brand
each, but equally strong brands.
We rst compare this benchmark case with a situation which may result from
a merger. In this alternative situation there is one multi-brand rm that owns the
brands in the subset K  S, with the number of elements in K denoted as #K, and
#K < s brands and a remaining set of rms which all own one brand.11 The multi-
11A generalization from there to the situation with several multi-brand rms is straightforward
and is discussed further below.
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brand rm may, for instance, be the result of a merger, namely if the rms owning
the set K = f1K ; :::(#K)Kg  S of brands merge and the resulting rm maintains all
brands formerly owned by the single rms.12 For notational convenience, we assume
that these brands are sorted by strength, with niK < niK+1. The multi-brand rm
then owns a portfolio of brands 1K ; :::(#K)K . It therefore internalizes the e¤ects of
the choice of the price for one of its brands for sales in one of the other brands. This
rm chooses a vector of prices pK  (p1K ; :::p(#K)K ) that maximizes this rms prots,
taking the prices pj chosen by all other single brand rms j as given. Similarly, these
s   (#K) other rms with single brands j =2 K choose their price pj independently
as in the benchmark case. Consumers who were loyal to one of the brands in the
benchmark case are assumed to remain loyal to their old brand13, and customers
without any brand loyalty in the benchmark case remain without brand loyalty.
Our focus is on the implications of merger in this framework and a comparison
of rmsequilibrium payo¤s in the benchmark situation and in the situation with a
multi-brand rm (i.e., after a merger). While we do not address the issue of endo-
geneity of mergers, the protability of a merger for the merging rms and for the
bystanding rms is an indication of the merger incentives if merger is endogenous.14
We rst recall the equilibrium solution for the benchmark case.
Proposition 1 (Kocas and Kiyak 2006) An equilibrium is characterized by the fol-
lowing pricing strategies: all rms owning brands j = 3; :::s choose pj = r. The
rms owning brands 1 and 2 choose their prices as mixed strategies described by the
12As discussed in the introduction, this is what often happened historically, for example, in the
luxury consumer products industry or in the car industry.
13It is not necessarily trivial to acquire a brand and still preserve customer loyalty for this brand
(see Jaju, Joiner and Reddy 2006). The theoretical considerations by Baye, Crocker and Ju (1996)
and Lommerud and Sørgard (1997) also show that the independence of brands in the process of a
merger should not be taken for granted, as they essentially depart from this assumption.
14There are many aspects of mergers other than the strategic aspects for market interaction.
Among these are, for instance, possible economies of scale in production, marketing or advertizing,
cost of restructuring, information spillovers etc. These other aspects also matter for mergers and
acquisitions, but when considering the strategic aspect of a merger for the interaction in the market
that is at the heart of the merger paradox, it makes sense to remove these other aspects from the
picture.
7
following cumulative distribution functions:
F1(p1) = 1 + n2m (1  rp1 ) for p1 2 [ n2rn2+m ; r) ; (2)
F2(p2) = 1 +
n1
m
  (n1+m)n2r
(n2+m)mp2
for p2 2 [ n2rn2+m ; r) (3)
and Fi(pi) = 0 for pi 2 [0; n2rn2+m) and Fi(pi) = 1 for pi  r for i = 1; 2. Firmspayo¤s
are j = rnj for all j = 2; :::s, and 1 = n1+mn2+mn2r.
A proof can be found in Kocas and Kiyak (2006). Some of the properties
of the equilibrium can be explained in intuitive terms. Each rm chooses between
two options: extracting a maximum of revenue from its loyal consumers by charging
their reservation price, essentially leaving the competition for the non-loyal customers
to others, or also competing for the non-loyal customers. In the latter case rm j
chooses a price pj < r. Accordingly, competing for the set of non-loyal consumers
has an opportunity cost: it reduces the margin that can be earned on the rms
loyal consumers. This opportunity cost is higher for rms which have a stronger
brand (i.e., a larger group of loyal customers). The rms with the weakest two
brands have the lowest opportunity cost of lowering prices. This is a competitive
advantage. In the equilibrium all strong brands stay out of this competition and
simply extract maximally from their loyal consumers. Their competition leads to an
equilibrium in mixed strategies.15 In the equilibrium they both randomize according
to the cumulative distribution functions as in (2) and (3) that are the same as in
the two-rm equilibrium analyzed by Narasimhan (1988). The lower bound of the
common support of equilibrium prices is precisely the price at which the rm owning
brand 2 (the second-weakest brand) is just indi¤erent between underbidding this price
and winning all non-loyal customers or choosing its reservation price and serving only
its own loyal customers.
Proposition 1 provides the point of departure for our analysis. The next propo-
sition considers competition with multi-brand rms that result from a merger and
compare the payo¤s with the benchmark case.
15An equilibrium in pure strategies for p1 and p2 can be ruled out: for each rm it is either superior
to choose a price slightly smaller than a given price chosen by the competitor, or the price chosen
by the competitor is so low that it is better not to compete for the non-loyal customers and to
resort to the rms loyal consumers and charge their reservation price. But then the low price of the
competitor is itself not an optimal reply.
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Proposition 2 Consider mergers that do not lead to a monopoly. (i) A merger that
leads to a multi-brand rm with a set K of brands such that f1; 2g  K is protable
for the merging rms and does not change the equilibrium payo¤s for all non-merging
rms. (ii) If f1; 2g * K, then an equilibrium is characterized by the same pricing
behavior as the ones described in Proposition 1, and the merger is neither protable
nor unprotable.
Proof. Consider part (i). Let f1; 2g  K. Let h be the weakest brand for which
h =2 K. We consider the following pricing strategies as a candidate for an equilibrium.
First, pj = r for all brands j 2 (Snf1; hg. Second, the multi-brand rm chooses p1
according to
F1(p1) =
8>><>>:
0 for p1 2 [0; nhrnh+m)
1 + nh
m
(1  r
p1
) for p1 2 [ nhrnh+m ; r)
1 for p1  r.
(4)
Third, the rm that owns brand h chooses ph according to
Fh(ph) =
8>><>>:
0 for ph 2 [0; nhrnh+m)
1 + n1
m
  (n1+m)nhr
(nh+m)mph
for ph 2 [ nhrnh+m ; r)
1 for ph  r
(5)
Given these choices, rmspayo¤s are j = rnj for all single-brand rms including
rm/brand h. The multi-brand rm makes a prot equal to rniK from each of its
brands except from brand 1K(= 1), and the contribution to prot by brand 1 is
1 =
n1+m
nh+m
nhr.
The merger is protable for the merging rms if n1+m
nh+m
nhr >
n1+m
n2+m
n2r. This
holds, as nh > n2 holds as 2 2 K. Note also that bystanding rms prots are
una¤ected by the merger.
We now show that these pricing strategies are mutually optimal replies. First,
we conrm that Fh maximizes h given F1 and pj = r for all other brand prices.
Note that h = (1   F1)phm + phnh = (1   (1 + nhm (1   rph )))phm + phnh = rnh for
any ph 2 [ nhrnh+m ; r], whereas h = ph(m + nh) < nhr for ph <
nhr
nh+m
and h = 0 for
ph > r. This proves the optimality of Fh for the single-brand rm that owns brand h.
Second, we conrm that pj = r maximizes j for all other single brand rms which,
by denition of h, have a larger group of loyal customers than brand h. Clearly,
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pj > r is dominated by pj = r. Moreover, for pj < r the payo¤ is
j = (1  F1(pj))(1  Fh(pj))pjm+ pjnj (6)
 (1  F1(pj))pjm+ pjnj
= (1  (1 + nh
m
(1  r
pj
)))pjm+ pjnj
< rnj
for all pj < r. The latter inequality makes use of the property nj > nh.
Turn now to the optimality of pricing choices of the brands that constitute the
merger group. Take Fh and pj = r for j 2 Sn(K [ fhg) as given. The multi-brand
rm chooses pK . Let pimin  minfp1K ; :::; p(#K)Kg the smallest component of pK .
Then the multi-brand rms payo¤ is
K(pK) = (1  Fh(pimin))piminm+
P
iK 2K
piKniK , (7)
if all piK  r for iK 2 K, and smaller if piK > r for some iK 2 K.
A necessary condition for this sum to be maximal for a given pimin is that
imin = 1K(= 1), i.e., the weakest brand is assigned the lowest price. This can be
conrmed as follows. The rst term in (7) depends only on pimin, but not on whether
imin = 1K or not. If imin = iK 6= 1K the second term in (7), iK2K(piKniK ); can be
increased by a joint adjustment of two prices: the price of brand imin is replaced by
the price previously assigned to brand 1K and vice versa.
The necessary condition imin = 1K can now be used to conclude that piK = r
for all iK 6= 1K is a necessary condition for (7) to be maximal. If imin = 1K , the
payo¤ (7) can be increased monotonically by increasing all piK up to piK = r for all
iK 6= 1K . This shows that the optimal reply is piK = r for all iK 6= 1K .
Given that piK = r for all iK 6= 1K , the optimality of p1K 2 [ nhrnh+m ; r) can be
shown by considering the multi-brand rms payo¤as a function of p1K , given piK = r
for all iK 6= 1K . This payo¤ is
K(p1K ) = (1  Fh(p1K ))p1Km+ p1Kn1K +
P
iK2Knf1Kg
rniK . (8)
The third term in (8) is independent of p1K . The sum of the rst and second term in
(8) is the same as if a single brand-rm owning brand 1K(= 1) would compete with the
single-brand rm with owning brand h only. Inserting Fh from (5) it is straightforward
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to see that the sum of these terms is equal to n1+m
nh+m
nhr for all p1K 2 [ nhrnh+m ; r), zero
for p1K > r and smaller than
n1+m
nh+m
nhr for all p1K <
nhr
nh+m
.
The case (ii) is relegated to the Appendix.
Part (i) is the more interesting part of Proposition 2. It shows that the for-
mation of multi-brand rms can benet the group of merging rms, provided that
the weakest brands are inside this group. The benet for the merging rms comes
from the fact that the new multi-brand rm owns both brands that competed most
ercely in the benchmark case without merger. After the merger the multi-brand
rm owning these brands can control the prices for all its brands and can prevent
the brands from competing internally. This will not prevent other single-brand rms
from competing for the non-loyal customers, and typically one of them will lower
its price. However, as these non-acquired rms only have brands that are stronger
than the weakest brands acquired and, hence, have higher opportunity costs in this
competition, they will compete less aggressively, and this drives up the payo¤ earned
on the weakest brand. In the benchmark case, the two weakest brands compete for
the non-loyal customers. If both these brands are owned by the acquiring rm, the
acquiring rm can order the second-weakest brand to charge the consumer reserva-
tion price r, rather than compete with brand 1 for non-loyal customers. This relaxes
competition and drives up the prots of the acquiring rm.
To illustrate the anti-competitive e¤ect further with an example, let the three
weakest brands with loyal cconsumer groups have size n1, n2 and n3 and let the set
of non-loyal consumers be of size m. In the benchmark case the equilibrium price
for brand 3 is p3 = r , whereas brands 1 and 2 compete choosing mixed strategies
(2) and (3). In this competition the rms end up with prots 3 = rn3, 2 = rn2
and 1 = n1+mn2+mn2r. If rm 1 acquires rm 2 (and, hence, brand 2), then rm 1 can
control the pricing for brands 1 and 2 and can prevent brand 2 from competing against
brand 1. In the new equilibrium, rm 1 still cannot simply choose to make p1 slightly
smaller than r and to sell to all non-loyal customers, because this would draw rm
3 into the competition for the non-loyal customers. Firm 3 essentially assumes the
former role of rm 2. The competition for the non-loyal customers will be between
brand 1 and brand 3. The benet for the acquiring rm emerges because rm/brand
3 is less aggressive than rm 2 in its pricing behavior, because rm/brand 3 has a
higher opportunity cost of underbidding brand 1 than the opportunity cost of brand
11
2, because rm/brand 3 has a larger group of loyal customers than brand 2. As a
result, the expected payo¤s 2 = rn2 and 3 = rn3 remain unchanged, but the prot
on brand 1 increases from n1+m
n2+m
n2r to n1+mn3+mn3r .
The intuition for Proposition 2 carries over to a further acquisition by the
multi-brand rm that enlarges its brand portfolio. Suppose for this purpose that
f1; 2g  K, and nh = minfnj jj =2 K g . Then it follows directly from Proposition
2 that any acquisition of a further single-brand rm other than the one that owns
brand h does not change the pricing equilibrium. The payo¤ of the multi-brand rm
simply increases by rnj from acquiring such an additional single-brand rm. Such a
further acquisition is not protable. However, if the multi-brand rm acquires the
rm owning brand h, then this changes the equilibrium. The equilibrium price for
this brand in the new equilibrium becomes ph = r, and the weakest brand that is
not owned by the multi-brand rm takes over the former role of brand h. If this is
brand h^, then ph^ changes from ph^ = r to a mixed strategy described by a cumulative
distribution function Fh^ as in (3) with nh^ replacing n2 in (2) and (3).
We can also discuss mergers starting from a case with several multi-brand
rms. For this purpose let there be  > 2 rms, with each rm owning a (non-
empty) portfolio of brands, with these portfolios denoted as sets K1; :::K , such that
fK1; :::Kg is a partition of S, and Kj = f1j; :::(#Kj)jg for j 2 f1; :::; g. Note that
the case of single-brand rms is a special case. Further, let the weakest brands in
the portfolios of each of the multi-brand rms be denoted as 11 ; :::1 , respectively,
and let the numbering of rms be such that n11 < ::: < n1 ; i.e., the weakest brand
in rm 1 is weaker than the weakest brand in rm 2 etc. up to rm . Each rm j
chooses one price for each of its brands, i.e., a vector of prices pj = (p1j ; :::p(#Kj)j),
simultaneously with all other rms. We can show:
Proposition 3 A pricing equilibrium exists for which pj = r for all j =2 f11; 12g,
and cumulative distribution functions F11 and F12 for prices p11 and p12 for brands 11
and 12 as in (2) and (3), with n1 and n2 being replaced by n11(= n1) and n12( n2),
respectively.
Proof. We only sketch the proof. A full proof applies arguments which, in detail, are
very similar to the arguments used in the proof of Proposition 2. Consider rst rm
1. The optimization problem of rm 1, given the candidate equilibrium strategies of
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all other rms, is exactly equivalent to the problem of the single multi-brand rm in
Proposition 1 to nd the optimal reply, given that F12(p12) for brand 12, and pj = r
for all other brands j 2 (Sn(K1 [ f12g), and the optimal reply is exactly the one
described in Proposition 2.
Turn now to the other multi-brand rms j. Consider rst a rm j > 2. Given
the cumulative distributions
F11(p) = 1 +
n12
m
(1  r
p
) for p 2 [ n12r
n12+m
; r) ; (9)
F12(p) = 1 +
n11
m
  (n11+m)n12r
(n12+m)mp
for p 2 [ n12r
n12+m
; r) ; (10)
F11(p) = F12(p) = 0 for p 2 [0; n12rn12+m) and F11(p) = F12(p) = 1 for p  r, and given
pj = r for all brands j =2 (f11; 12g [Kj), we conrm that any vector pj 6= (r; r; :::; r)
yields a lower payo¤ than the price vector (r; r; :::; r). For any p^j with p^ij < r for
ij 6= 1j, rm j can increase its prot by choosing pj which is identical with p^j in all
components except in component ij, where p^ij < r is replaced by pij = r. To see
this, note that a change to pij = r cannot lead to a lower sales revenue on any of js
brands other than ij, but the sales revenue on ij for p^ij < r is at most equal to
(1  F11(p^ij))(1  F12(p^ij))m+ p^ijnij < rnij (11)
by nij > n12, analogously to the reasoning in (6).
Finally, consider rm j = 2, given F11(p11) and pi = r for all i 2 (SnK2[f11g).
Again, it can be shown that for any p^2 with p^i2 < r for i2 6= 12, rm 2 can increase
its prot either by a straightforward increase in pi2 to pi2 = r (which is the case
if p^i2 6= minfp^12 ; :::; p^(#K2)2g, or by simultaneously replacing p^12 with p^i2 and by
increasing pi2 to pi2 = r. This way it can, again, be argued that any optimal reply
needs to be of the format (p12 ; r; r; :::; r). From here, the optimizing problem of rm 2
is reduced to the optimal choice of p12 , and it is analogous to the proof in Proposition
2 to see that any p12 2 [ n12rn12+m ; r] is optimal.
In other words, in the equilibrium with several multi-brand rms, the prices of
all brands are equal to the consumersreservation prices, except for the prices of two
brands. These two brands are owned by di¤erent rms, and one of the two brands
is the weakest among all brands. By the notation used here, this weakest brand is
11. The other brand is 12; it is owned by rm 2, and it is the weakest brand among
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the brands owned by rm 2. Note that 12 can be a much stronger brand than most
of the brands owned by rm 1, and it need not be the second weakest brand among
all brands. Actual competition for the non-loyal customers occurs through these two
brands. The key to the proof of Proposition 3 is the observation that the optimal
reply pKj of the multi-brand rm in the equilibrium given the pricing behavior of all
other rms depends only on the prices chosen by these rms, but not on whether the
prices for all these brands are chosen by a large number of single-brand rms, or by
a smaller number of multi-brand rms.
Taking Proposition 3 as the point of departure, we can address the question
of the protability of a merger. For this purpose note that the equilibrium payo¤s of
all multi-brand rms j  2 are equal toX
ij2Kj
rnij : (12)
The payo¤ of the rm owning brand 11 equals
n11 +m
n12 +m
n12r +
X
i12K1nf11g
rni1 : (13)
Inspection of these expressions shows our key result: a merger is protable only if the
merging rms hold brands 11 and 12, or, in words:
Proposition 4 A merger between multi-brand rms that does not lead to a monopoly
increases the sum of the merging rms payo¤s if and only if this merger includes
rms owning the brands for which the equilibrium prices are lower on average than
the reservation prize for loyal consumers in the pricing equilibrium without merger.
Summarizing, we found that merger is protable for rms if these rms own
the two brands for which a deviation from pj = r is optimal in the equilibrium without
merger, that is, if the rms who own the brands which actively compete for the non-
loyal customers merge. While the merger will generally not eliminate competition for
the non-loyal customers, it will relax this competition, because this competition will
involve a stronger brand than in the absence of the merger, and this stronger brand
has a higher opportunity cost of competing for the non-loyal customers.
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3 Conclusions
Brand loyalty is an important element of rmsprice competition. We consider how
ownership of multiple brands a¤ects the outcome of Bertrand competition with many
loyal customer groups and with a group of price-sensitive non-loyal customers. Our
main research question is how prots are a¤ected by mergers and acquisitions, if the
acquiring rm keeps the brands and acquires the group of loyal customers with this
brand. We nd that many types of merger and the brand portfolio reallocations they
imply are neutral as regards their strategic aspects for market competition. However,
we also identify mergers and acquisitions that reallocate brand portfolios in a way that
has strategic e¤ects for the market competition outcome. Particularly if rms with
weak brands absorb other weak brands, this may shield these weak brands and relax
competition among weak brands. It also draws stronger brands into the competition
for non-loyal customers. Our results contribute a strategic market-interaction-based
explanation to why some rms acquire large conglomerates of brands.
It is interesting to compare our analysis with the analysis by Baye, Crocker
and Ju (1996), as they also refer to car producers with many brands in a merger con-
text. They use GM as an example of multiple, mutually competing divisions under
the umbrella of a holding company for the possibly benecial strategic e¤ects of the
creation of multiple decision units inside a rm that compete both with other rms
and among each other. Their claim is that GM and other rms used a strategy of
divisionalization to generate an e¤ect that just reverses the e¤ect of the merger: hold-
ing companies consisting of multiple rms that compete with each other can attract
a larger share of total industry prot than one single monolithic rm with a fully
coordinated policy with quantity competition. This increase in market share may
dominate the reduction in industry prot as a whole. Their theoretical result, consid-
ering divisionalization as the inverse of merger, is intellectually appealing. However,
their divisionalization argument captures only one part of the story of the US car
industry. Historically, the creation of multi-brand rms such as GM or Chrysler is
not mainly the result of a rm splitting its operation into several divisions. GM was
the result of a merger of several smaller car producers, and many of its brands, such
as Pontiac, Cadillac, Hummer, or Opel were acquired rather than newly generated.
An industry structure dominated by the big three, GM, Chrysler and Ford, is mainly
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the outcome of a wave of new rm entries, followed by a process of acquistions, merg-
ers and exits. Where rms acquired a rm with another brand, they often kept and
preserved the acquired brand.16
We take account of the fact that many multi-brand companies are not the
outcome of a process of divisionalization, but of a process of acquisitions, together
with the policy to keep the acquired brands alive; hence, mergers and acquisitions
need to be explained in many cases, rather than a split-up of rms in di¤erent,
competing brands. In some cases the brand itself may have been the most valuable
object acquired.17 Our framework provides such an explanation.
4 Appendix
In the Appendix we prove part (ii) of Proposition 2.
Proof. For a proof of part (ii) it is su¢ cient to show that the strategies in Proposition
1 are mutually best replies if f1; 2g * K. Three cases need to be distinguished:
f1; 2g \K = ? (case 1), 1 =2 K but 2 2 K (case 2) and 1 2 K but 2 =2 K (case 3).
Note that, for all three cases, we can take pj  r for granted, as pj > r is clearly
dominated by pj = r for all j 2 S.
Consider rst the case f1; 2g \ K = ?. Given that the single-brand rms
strategies are optimal replies (which follows directly from Proposition 1), it is su¢ cient
to show that, given F1 and F2 and pj for all j =2 K as in Proposition 1, the merged
rm cannot do better than by choosing piK = r for all iK 2 K. If the multi-brand
rm follows the strategy in the candidate equilibrium, the rms payo¤ is equal toX
iK2K
rniK . (A1)
16Klepper (2002), for instance, reports that the structure of the US car industry is an outcome of
a consolidation process: while more than 500 rms entered into this market in its rst 20 years, exits
and acquisitions led to an industry which was dominated by GM, Ford and Chrysler, accounting for
more than 80 percent of the output in the US car industry in the years after 1930. Klepper presents
the acquisitions of Olds Motor Works, Cadillac and Chevrolet by GM as an illustrative example.
17An example illustrating this claim is the struggle between BMW and Volkswagen over the
takeover of Rolls-Royce/Bentley which was a rm with two strong brands; the struggle ended with
each of them obtaining one of the two brands. Bahadir, Bharadwaj and Srivastava (2008) report
that the value of brands is often a substantial fraction of the takeover price.
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If the merged rm deviates and chooses any other joint distribution F (pK), the
resulting payo¤ is lower. To conrm this consider any deviation p^K 6= (r; r; :::; r) .
Let p^jmin the smallest component in p^K , with p^jmin < r. Then the maximum payo¤
that may emerge from this choice for the merged rm is bounded from above by
(1  F1(p^jmin))(1  F2(p^jmin))p^jminm+
X
jK2K
p^jKnjK (A2)
 (1  F1(p^jmin))p^jminm+ p^jminnjmin +
X
jK2Knfjming
njKr
<
X
jK2K
njKr
The latter inequality follows from inserting F1(p) as in (2) and njmin > n2.
Consider next the case with 2 2 K, 1 =2 K. Again, if the multi-brand rm
chooses the same pricing strategy as a collection of single-brand rms owning these
brands, then the remaining single-brand rms strategies are individually optimal
replies to this strategy by Proposition 1. Consider the multi-brand rm given F1(p)
as in (2) and given pj = r for all j 2 Sn(K [ f1g). Let iK 2 K be sorted by
increasing brand strength. Then 1K = 2 . We rst show that, for any p^K with
piK 6= r for iK 6= 1 a price vector exists that yields higher prots. To see this, several
cases need to be distinguished. If p^iK > minfp^1K ; p^2K ; :::p^(#K)Kg, then a simple
increase of piK from piK = p^iK to piK = r increases the multi-brand rms prot by
(r   p^iK )niK > 0. If p^iK = minfp^1K ; p^2K ; :::p^(#K)Kg for iK 6= 1K , then the following
changes in components of p^K increase the rms prot: an increase from piK = p^iK to
piK = r combined with a decrease from p1K = p^1K to p1K = p^iK increases prots by
at least (r  p^iK )niK   (p^1K   p^iK )n1K > 0. This shows that any optimal price vector
must be of the form (p1K ; r; :::r). But for this set of price vectors, given F1(p1), any
p1K 2 [ n2rn2+m ; r] yields the same payo¤ and this payo¤ is higher than for any p1K > r
or for p1K <
n2r
n2+m
.
Consider nally the case with 1 2 K, 2 =2 K. Again, if the multi-brand rm
chooses the same pricing strategy as a collection of single-brand rms owning these
brands, then the remaining single-brand rmsstrategies are optimal replies to this
strategy by Proposition 1. Consider therefore the multi-brand rm for given pricing
strategies F2(p2) as in (3) and pj = r for all j 2 Sn(K [ f2g). Let iK 2 K be sorted
by increasing brand strength, such that 1K = 1, and 2K > 2. We rst show that, for
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any p^K with piK 6= r for iK 6= 11 a price vector exists that yields higher prot. To
see this, several cases need to be distinguished. If p^1K = minfp^1K ; p^2K ; :::p^sKg, then
an increase of piK from piK = p^iK to piK = r for iK 6= 1K increases the multi-brand
rms prot by (r  p^iK )niK > 0. If p^iK = minfp^1K ; p^2K ; :::p^(#K)Kg for some iK 6= 1K ,
then an increase from piK = p^iK to piK = r combined with a decrease of p1K from
p1K = p^1K to p1K = p^iK increases prots by at least (r  p^iK )niK (p^1K  p^iK )n1K > 0.
This shows that any optimal reply must be of the form (p1K ; r; :::r). But for this set
of price vectors, given F2(p2), any p1K 2 [ n2rn2+m ; r) yields the same payo¤ and this
payo¤ is higher than for any p1K  r or for p1K < n2rn2+m .
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